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Abstract
We provide a representation for the nonmyopic optimal portfolio of an agent
consuming only at the terminal horizon when the single state variable follows a
general diffusion process and the market consists of one risky asset and a risk-free
asset. The key term of our representation is a new object that we call the “rate
of macroeconomic fluctuation” whose properties are fundamental for the portfolio
dynamics.
We show that, under natural cyclicality conditions, (i) the agent’s hedging
demand is positive (negative) when the product of his prudence and risk tolerance
is below (above) 2 and (ii) the portfolio weights decrease in risk aversion. We
apply our results to study a general continuous-time capital asset pricing model
and show that under the same cyclicality conditions, the market price of risk is
countercyclical and the price of the risky asset exhibits excess volatility.
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1 Introduction
The problem of optimal portfolio allocation for a long-run investor, in a market with one
risky asset and a risk-free asset, is of fundamental importance in financial economics.
When the market price of risk (MPR) and/or interest rates are stochastic, the optimal
portfolio is inherently nonmyopic and depends on not only current asset returns but also
their future fluctuations. As Merton (1969, 1971) indicates, the optimal portfolio can
be decomposed into two components: a myopic, instantaneously mean-variance efficient
component and a strategic, nonmyopic component responsible for hedging against future
changes in the investment opportunity set. Several recent empirical studies indicate
that the hedging component may represent a huge fraction (40–100%) of total portfolio
holdings.1 However, since it is generally not possible to derive closed–form expressions
for nonmyopic optimal portfolios, very little is known about their dependence on the
agent’s risk preferences and the dynamic properties of asset returns.
This paper provides representations for nonmyopic optimal portfolios of an agent
consuming only at the terminal horizon when the single state variable follows a general
diffusion process. The key additional assumption we make is that the state price density
is a function of the underlying state variable. This assumption holds true if and only if
the price of the risky asset in the economy and the interest rate of the risk-free asset are
viable; that is, they can be realized in a complete market equilibrium within the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) if the representative agent is chosen appropriately. This
makes our results perfectly suited to equilibrium analysis, which we present in the second
part of the paper. We use the obtained representations to generate empirical predictions
and establish various properties of the nonmyopic portfolio strategies.
We introduce a new object that we call the “rate of macroeconomic fluctuation”
and show that the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation is the key element of all representa-
tions derived in this paper, both in the single–agent partial equilibrium setting and in the
general equilibrium setting. The rate of macroeconomic fluctuation is an intrinsic char-
acteristic of the state variable dynamics and has the following interesting property: in
equilibrium, the risk-neutral drift of the MPR is independent of the form of the agents’
utility functions and is always equal to the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation. As a
result, the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation can be directly estimated from the data
as the difference between the drift of the MPR and the product of the MPR and its
1See Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Barberis (2000).
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volatility.2
We show that the intertemporal hedge against the MPR fluctuations has two com-
ponents: a wealth hedge and a risk tolerance hedge. The wealth (risk tolerance) hedge
is given by the covariance of the agent’s future wealth (risk tolerance) with the future
MPR, discounted by the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation.
Our representation allows us to determine the precise dependence of the optimal
portfolios on the market’s and the agent’s characteristics. In particular, we show that
the optimal investment in the risky asset is monotonically decreasing in risk aversion in
the sense of Ross (1981) as long as the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation is constant.
This result is quite striking in its generality, as it holds for arbitrary utilities, arbitrary
dividend volatility and arbitrary stochastic interest rates. It also generates this empirical
prediction: if the volatility of the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation is relatively low,
more risk averse agents should invest less in the risky asset.
We show that, when the MPR is countercyclical, the hedging demand is positive if
and only if the product of the agent’s prudence and risk tolerance is below 2. We provide
an intuitive explanation of this non-obvious result and relate it to the precautionary
savings motive.
If we adopt the common hypothesis that agents have hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) utilities, our results generate the prediction that the variation in the
MPR hedging demand of an agent is explained by the variation in the co-movement of
agent’s wealth and the discounted MPR. This prediction can be tested directly using
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. It would allow us to gain a deeper
understanding of the joint fluctuations of household wealth and optimal portfolios. For
example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) find that the fraction of wealth that households
invest in risky assets does not change with the level of wealth. They use this finding to
conclude that households’ relative risk aversion is constant. However, if this risk aversion
is different from 1, the optimal portfolio must be nonmyopic and contain a hedging
component. Given our representation of hedging demand, the findings of Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) imply, in our model, that the degree of co-movement of households’
wealth with the MPR is stable and does not fluctuate over time. It would be of interest
to test this prediction and determine the degree to which investment by households is
driven by the nonmyopic demand.
2That is, the MPR λ follows the dynamics dλt = λt (µλt dt + σ
λ
t dBt) with the drift µ
λ
t = ρt + λt σ
λ
t
where ρt is the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation.
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In the section on equilibrium dynamics, we provide tight conditions for MPR coun-
tercyclicality and for the positivity of the nonmyopic (excess) volatility. We show that,
when interest rate volatility is small, MPR is countercyclical if the product of the ag-
gregate risk aversion and dividend volatility is countercyclical and the rate of macroe-
conomic fluctuation is procyclical. This result extends the characterization of He and
Leland (1993) to general dividend processes and stochastic interest rates. In particu-
lar, we show, in contrast to the sufficient conditions in the framework of that paper,
that when the state variable follows a general diffusion process even countercyclicality
of both dividend volatility and aggregate risk aversion may not be sufficient for MPR to
be countercyclical, as its equilibrium behavior depends on the dynamics of the rate of
macroeconomic fluctuation.
In complete analogy with the optimal portfolios, we show that the volatility of the
risky asset can be decomposed into myopic and nonmyopic components. The latter plays
the role of “excess” volatility and is positive under the same conditions for which MPR
is countercyclical. As above, these conditions are tight.
In the special case when the log-dividend follows an autoregressive process and all
agents have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, our results are strength-
ened further. We find explicit bounds on MPR, excess volatility, risk-return tradeoff and
the size of equilibrium optimal portfolios in terms of the spread between the highest and
the lowest risk aversion in the economy. This is a natural measure of heterogeneity, and
our bounds can be used to estimate this measure from data.
We conclude the introduction with a discussion of the related literature. Our paper
is most closely related to the fundamental work by Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher
(2003) and Detemple and Rindisbacher (2005, 2009), who were the first to use Mallia-
vian calculus to derive general representations for intertemporal hedging demand with
general utilities and a general multi-dimensional diffusion state variable. In our paper,
the assumption that the market is viable leads to a particularly simple and intuitive rep-
resentation of optimal portfolios and allows us to establish several important economic
properties of the latter.
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002), Aura, Diamond and Geanakoplos (2002) and Gol-
lier (2004) investigate nonmyopic portfolios in a discrete time two–period model. In
particular, Gollier (2004) studies the effect of first- and second-order predictability in
returns in the sign of the hedging demand. Our introduction of the rate of macroeco-
nomic fluctuation allows us to determine the sign of hedging demand for very general
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continuous-time dynamic settings with an arbitrary time horizon.
A substantial body of literature is devoted to the partial equilibrium continuous-
time nonmyopic optimal portfolio behavior in complete and incomplete markets when
utilities belong to the HARA class and stock prices follow an affine process. This specifi-
cation allows for closed-form solutions for optimal portfolios (see Kim and Omberg 1996
and Wachter 2002).
Most existing work devoted to standard CAPM with heterogeneous risk preferences
has been done in special models with two CRRA agents only. Dumas (1989) considers
a production economy of that type. In this case, the risky asset returns coincide with
the exogenously specified returns on production technology, and only the risk-free rate
is determined endogenously. Wang (1996) studies the term structure of interest rates
in an economy populated by two CRRA agents, maximizing time-additive utility from
intermediate consumption and the aggregate dividend following a geometric Brownian
motion. Basak and Cuoco (1998) study equilibria with two agents and limited stock mar-
ket participation. Bhamra and Uppal (2009) also consider an economy with two agents
and derive conditions under which market volatility is higher than dividend volatility.3
Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2009a, 2009b) study asymptotic equilibrium dynamics with an
arbitrary number of CRRA agents maximizing utility from terminal consumption as the
horizon increases.
Only a few papers have studied general properties of equilibria with non-CRRA
preferences and/or a general dividend process.4 Our paper is partially related to He
and Leland (1993).5 They also allow for an arbitrary dividend process and describe the
set of viable price processes, that is, all price processes that can be attained by varying
the utility of the representative agent. One of their main results declares that when the
dividend is a geometric Brownian motion, MPR is countercyclical if and only if the risk
aversion is countercyclical. Our representation allows us to prove the most general result
of this kind. More precisely, we show that countercyclical risk aversion generally is not
sufficient, and countercyclicality of dividend volatility and procyclicality of the rate of
macroeconomic fluctuation are needed.
3The main message of Bhamra and Uppal (2009) is that allowing the agents to trade in an additional
derivative security, making the market complete, may actually increase market volatility. Because of
completeness, their equilibrium coincides with the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of Wang (1996).
4Some papers study static, one-period economies with heterogeneous preferences. See Benninga and
Mayshar (2000), Gollier (2001), Hara, Huang and Kuzmics (2007). There are also conditions for zero
equilibrium trading volume. See Berrada, Hugonnier and Rindisbacher (2007).
5See also Bick (1990) and Wang (1993).
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In a number of models, heterogeneity arises from beliefs and asymmetric informa-
tion, as in Basak (2005), Jouini and Napp (2009), Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2009)
and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009). In particular, the latter paper studies excess
volatility and nonmyopic optimal portfolios in a model with two CRRA agents with
identical preferences but heterogeneous beliefs. Methodologically, our paper is close to
Detemple and Zapatero (1991), Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003), Detemple
and Rindisbacher (2009), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Bharma and Uppal
(2009), as we use Malliavin calculus to obtain the main results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup and notation.
In Section 3, we introduce the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation and in Section 4 we
use the latter to derive representations for the MPR. Section 5 studies monotonicity of
optimal portfolios in risk aversion. Section 6 is devoted to the properties of hedging
demand. Sections 7 and 8 study a general continuous-time CAPM with only terminal
consumption. Section 9 concludes.
2 Setup and Notation
2.1 The Model
The economy has a finite horizon and evolves in continuous time. Uncertainty is de-
scribed by a one-dimensional, standard Brownian motion Bt, t ∈ [0 , T ] on a complete
probability space (Ω,FT , P ), where F is the augmented filtration generated by Bt. There
is a single state variable Dt evolving according to
D−1t dDt = µ
D(Dt) dt + σ
D(Dt) dBt.
This diffusion process lives on (0,+∞) and σD(Dt) > 0.6
We make the following key assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption 2.1 The market is viable; that is, the unique state price density ξT is given
by ξT = g(DT ) for some smooth and strictly decreasing function g, and the interest rate
process rt is given by rt = r(Dt) for some smooth function r.
Assumption 2.1 is natural because it holds in any general equilibrium model with
the single state variable Dt. Indeed, in Merton’s (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing
6We assume that µD and σD are such that a unique strong solution exists and also that µD ∈ C1(R+),
σD ∈ C2(R+). In general, whenever we use a derivative of a function, we implicitly assume it exists.
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model (ICCAPM), ξt = e
−ρt U ′(Dt), where Dt is the aggregate dividend and ρ and U
are respectively the discount rate and the utility function of the representative agent,
maximizing utility from intermediate consumption. Furthermore, in this case rt = r(Dt)
with
r(x) = ρ+ γU(x)µD(x) − 0.5 γU(x)PU(x) (σD(x))2 . (1)
For the case of terminal consumption CAPM (see Bick (1990), He and Leland (1993),
and Section 8 below), ξT = U
′(DT ), where U is the utility function of the representative
agent.7 In this case, the interest rate process is not determined in equilibrium and can be
specified exogenously because agents need not substitute consumption between periods.
For this reason, everywhere in the sequel, we will write ξT = U
′(DT ) where we have
defined U(c) =
∫ c
1
g(x) dx.
Given the interest rate process rt, the unique state price density process ξ = (ξt)
is given by
ξt = e
− R t0 rs dsMt,
where Mt is the density process of the equivalent martingale measure Q,(
dQ
dP
)
t
= Mt = Et[MT ] .
Given a state price density process, we can always construct a corresponding financial
market by assuming there are two types of assets available for trading at any moment:
an instantaneously risk-free bond with rate of return rt and a risky asset, a stock, with
the price process St given by either
St = M
−1
t Et[MT DT ] = E
Q
t [ e
− R Tt rs dsDT ] (2)
or
St = M
−1
t Et
[∫ ∞
t
Mτ Dτ dτ
]
= EQt
[∫ ∞
t
e−
R τ
t rθ dθDτ dτ
]
. (3)
The instantaneous drift and volatility of stock price St are denoted by µ
S
t and σ
S
t
7In general, we could consider an economy populated by two types of agents: those deriving utility
from intermediate consumption with a possibly infinite time horizon and those deriving utility from
terminal consumption (wealth) at some prescribed time horizon. For example, we could think of these
agents as fund managers. See Grossman and Zhou (1996) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2010). In this case, we
would need to assume that the aggregate dividend has both a continuous rate component and a lumpy
component, paid at those prescribed time periods.
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respectively, so that8
dSt
St
= µSt dt + σ
S
t dBt .
For simplicity, we always assume that stock volatility σSt is almost surely nonnegative.
9
The MPR λt is given by
λt =
µSt − rt
σSt
.
It also can be calculated directly from the state-price density process using the equation
ξ−1t dξt = −rt dt − λt dBt .
An economic agent k chooses portfolio strategy pik t, the portfolio weight in the risky
asset at time t, as to maximize the expected utility10
E [uk(Wk T )]
of the terminal wealth WkT , where the wealth Wkt of agent k evolves as
dWkt = Wkt
[
rt dt + pik t (S
−1
t dSt − rt dt)
]
.
Introduce the inverse of the marginal utility
Ik(x) := (u
′
k)
−1(x) . (4)
It is well known that in this complete market setting the optimal terminal wealth is given
by
Wk T = Ik(yk ξT )
where yk is determined via the budget constraint
11
E[Ik(yk ξT ) ξT ] = Wk 0 .
3 Rate of Macroeconomic Fluctuations
In this section we introduce a new object, the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation. This
rate will play a crucial role in the sequel as it will appear in expressions for all quantities
8It is possible to show that the market is viable if and only if the diffusion coefficients of St satisfy
certain differential equations. See Bick (1990) and Wang (1993).
9This is always true if the interest rate rt is not excessively procyclical. See Appendix.
10We assume that uk is C3(R+) and satisfies standard Inada conditions.
11We assume that a unique value of yk satisfying the budget constraint exists.
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in both partial and general equilibrium (MPR, stock volatility and optimal portfolios)
and will have a fundamental impact on their static and dynamic properties.
Two forces drive the stochastic dynamics of the state variableDt: stochastic volatil-
ity σD(Dt) and stochastic drift µ
D(Dt). The volatility σ
D determines the size of macroe-
conomic fluctuation. To understand the role of µD, we will “extract” all stochastic
volatility from Dt.
Fix an x0 ∈ R+ and introduce the function
F (x)
def
=
∫ x
x0
1
y σD(y)
dy , x > 0 .
Then a direct calculation shows that the diffusion coefficient of the process
At
def
= F (Dt)
is equal to 1. Since At is also an Ito diffusion, its dynamics are given by
dAt = C(At) dt + dBt .
Definition 3.1 The negative instantaneous expected change of the volatility-extracted
process At will be referred to as the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation and denoted ρt.
More precisely, we define
ρt
def
= −C ′(At) . (5)
By definition, we have
ρt = c
D(Dt) .
with
c(x) = cD(x)
def
= −C ′(F (x)) .
It follows directly from the definition that the function c is invariant under functional
transformations. That is, if Dt = g(D˜t) for some process D˜t and a smooth, increasing
function g, then
cD(g(x)) = cD˜(x) .
In particular, the following is true
Corollary 3.2 The rate of macroeconomic fluctuation ρt is constant if and only if the
state variable Dt is a smooth and strictly increasing function of an autoregressive process
dAt = (a − bAt) dt + dBt. (6)
In this case, ρt = b.
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As our benchmark example throughout the paper, we consider a simple gener-
alization of Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as the dividend process by having
At = logDt satisfy (6). Then if b > 0, the growth rate of the economy (the log dividend)
is mean reverting. On the other hand, if b < 0, the growth rate of the economy departs
from the “mean” a at the rate equal to −b.
Using a direct calculation based on Ito’s formula, it is possible to verify that func-
tion c(x) is given by12
c(x) = −x(µD)′(x)+x(σD)′(x)σD(x)−1µD(x)+(σD)′(x)σD(x)x+0.5(σD)′′(x)x2σD(x).
(7)
This expression was introduced in the fundamental work of Detemple, Garcia, and
Rindisbacher (2003), who used it to derive representations for optimal portfolios in gen-
eral diffusion-driven models. Our new formula (5) provides a very intuitive economic
interpretation of this object and makes some of its properties (such as functional invari-
ance) particularly clear.
4 The Market Price of Risk
Recall that by assumption the market is viable and the state price density ξT is given
by ξT = U
′(DT ) for some strictly concave function U. Let
γU(x) = −xU
′′(x)
U ′(x)
.
In an equilibrium setting,13 U is the utility of the representative agent and γU is the
relative risk aversion of the representative agent. We also will need the following:
Definition 4.1 We will refer to
σD(t , τ)
def
= e−
R τ
t ρs ds σD(Dτ )
as the discounted aggregate volatility. We will refer to
σr(t , τ)
def
= e−
R τ
t ρs ds σr(Dτ )
as the discounted interest rate volatility. We will refer to
λ(t , τ)
def
= e−
R τ
t ρs ds λτ
12See Appendix.
13Either with terminal or with intermediate consumption.
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as the discounted MPR, and we will refer to
σmyopict
def
= EQt
[
σD(t , T )
]
(8)
as the myopic volatility.
In general, we call myopic all quantities that are determined by the present market
value of their (possibly discounted) end-of-horizon values. In other words, their current
value does not depend on their future co-movement with other market variables but only
on the “myopic estimate” of their future value.
The next result provides a representation of the MPR in terms of the quantities
introduced in Definition 4.1 and highlights the role of myopic volatility.
Theorem 4.2 The MPR is given by the present market value of future discounted MPR
net of the present cumulative value of the future discounted interest rate volatility,
λt = E
Q
t [λ(t , T ) ] − EQt
[ ∫ T
t
σr(t, s) ds
]
(9)
where
λT = γ
U(DT )σ
D(DT ) . (10)
In particular, if γU = γ is constant, then
λt = γ σ
myopic
t − EQt
[ ∫ T
t
σr(t, s) ds
]
. (11)
Theorem 4.2 shows that the assumed market viability leads to very interesting
properties of the MPR dynamics. To gain economic intuition behind the representation
(9), it is instructive to compare the result of Theorem 4.2 with the analogous results for
a terminal consumption CAPM. When the interest rate is constant, the dividend follows
a GBM with volatility σ and the representative agent’s risk aversion γU = γ is constant,
we have
λt = γ σ.
Formula (11) shows that when the dividend is not a GBM, the role of the fundamental
volatility σ is played by the myopic volatility σmyopict . The latter is given by the present
market value of future dividend volatility, discounted at the rate of macroeconomic fluc-
tuation ρt, and thus depends on the dynamic properties of Dt in a nontrivial way. In
10
particular, dividend volatility by itself is not enough for determining the size of the
equilibrium MPR. We need to know the rate ρt. For example, if ρt is always positive
(negative), the level of fundamental volatility leads to overestimating (underestimating)
the size of the MPR.
To understand the intuition behind this discounting, consider a simple modification
of Merton’s CAPM, for which the log-dividend follows (6) with b > 0 and both γU = γ
and r are constant. Then ρt = b and
λt = γ σ e
−b (T−t) .
That is, the equilibrium riskiness of the stock is given by σ e−b (T−t) . On the other hand,
the stock riskiness is determined by its sensitivity to changes in the state variable Dt :
If the stock price moves significantly in response to a change in the dividend, the stock
is risky; if the sensitivity is small, stock price fluctuations are small and the stock is
less risky. As recalled in (2), the stock price is the expectation (under the risk-neutral
measure) of future dividends. If b > 0, log dividends are mean reverting, and therefore,
stock price sensitivity to dividend changes is smaller than in the case b = 0. This
drives down the stock riskiness and the equilibrium MPR. However, as time t approaches
terminal horizon T, insufficient time remains for the dividends to mean-revert, and the
sensitivity of expected future dividends to changes in the current value of the dividend
grows exponentially at the rate b, equal to the rate of mean-reversion. Thus, stock
riskiness also grows exponentially, and converges to the riskiness of the dividend when
t ↑ T .
The situation is opposite when the rate ρt = b is negative. Then the log-dividend
is nonstationary, and every small fluctuation around the mean may force the dividend
to deviate substantially. Hence, stock is riskier than in the case b = 0, and the MPR
goes up. However, as time t approaches T, there is insufficient time remaining for the
dividend to deviate, riskiness decreases at the rate b, and the equilibrium MPR goes
down.
When the interest rate is stochastic, another term, EQt
[∫ T
t
σr(t, s) ds
]
, appears in
(11). To understand the intuition behind this term, suppose that the interest rate is
procyclical.14 Then bond prices are countercyclical. Thus, bonds are expensive when
stocks are cheap. This drives up the demand for stocks, pushing up the equilibrium stock
price, and, consequently, equilibrium stock returns and the MPR decrease.
14We call an economic variable countercyclical if it is monotonically decreasing in Dt and procyclical
otherwise.
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In Merton’s (1973) ICCAPM, the MPR process is given by γU(Dt)σ(Dt) for the
representative agent’s utility U and the interest rate is given by (1). This specific form
of the interest rate dynamics leads to the following interesting identity: in Merton’s
ICCAPM, we always have
EQt [λ(t , T ) ] − EQt
[ ∫ T
t
σr(t, s) ds
]
= γU(Dt)σ(Dt) (12)
for any T ≥ t. To the best of our knowledge, identity (12) has never previously appeared
in the literature.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.3 The process
e−
R t
0 ρs ds λt +
∫ t
0
e−
R s
0 ρθdθ σrs ds
is a martingale under the equilibrium risk-neutral measure. In particular, if the interest
rate is constant, the drift of the MPR is independent of U and is always equal to ρt.
We believe that formulae (9) and (12) and the result of Corollary 4.3 are of fun-
damental importance because they are model-independent. Therefore, they generate
universal empirical predictions that can be used to test various versions of complete
market CAPM.
For example, if we ignore the interest rate volatility term, as is justified by its very
low empirical values, we get that MPR evolves under the physical measure as
dλt = λt (µ
λ
t dt + σ
λ
t dBt) ,
with the drift µλt given by
µλt = ρt + λt σ
λ
t .
If we estimate the MPR λt, its volatility σ
λ
t and drift µ
λ
t from the data, we immediately
obtain an estimate for the rate ρt :
ρt = λt σ
λ
t − µλt .
In this sense, the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation is directly observable and various
statistical hypotheses about ρt can be directly tested.
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5 Optimal Portfolios
Let
Uk t(x)
def
= sup
pi
Et [uk(WkT ) |Wkt = x ]
be the value function of agent k.15 The effective relative risk aversion of agent k at time
t is defined via
γk t = γk t(Wkt)
def
= −Wkt U
′′
k t(Wkt)
U ′k t(Wkt)
.
When the investment opportunity set is nonstochastic, the optimal portfolio is myopic,
instantaneously mean-variance efficient, and is given by16
pimyopick t
def
=
λt
γk t σSt
.
It is known (He and Huang (1994)) that the effective absolute risk tolerance
Rkt =
Wk t
γk t
(i.e., the absolute risk tolerance of the value function) is a discounted martingale under
the risk-neutral measure. Consequently, the following result holds:
Proposition 5.1 We have
Wk tpi
myopic
k t =
λt
σSt
Rkt =
λt
σSt
EQt [ e
− R Tt rs dsRkT ] . (13)
We denote
pihedgingk t
def
= pik t − pimyopick t
and refer to it as the hedging portfolio. This is the nonmyopic component of the optimal
portfolio that the agent uses to hedge against (or, take advantage of) future fluctuations
in the stochastic opportunity set.
Recall that by Definition 4.1,
λ(t , T )
def
= e−
R T
t ρs ds λT , σ
r(t, τ) = e−
R τ
t ρs ds σrτ
are respectively the MPR and the interest rate volatility, discounted at the rate of macroe-
conomic fluctuation. The following result then holds:
15Note that Uk t depends on Dt but we suppress this dependence.
16Merton (1969,1971).
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Theorem 5.2 We have
pihedgingk t = pi
MPR hedge
k t + pi
IR hedge
k t
with the MPR hedging component
piMPR hedgek t = −
1
σSt Wk t
×
CovQt
(
λ(t , T ) , e−
R T
t rs ds (Wk T − Rk T )
)
.
(14)
and the interest rate (IR) hedging component
piIR hedgek t =
1
σSt
(
1
γk t
− 1
)
EQt
[ ∫ T
t
σr(t, τ) dτ
]
. (15)
Formulae (14) and (15) provide closed-form expressions for hedging portfolios.
They show that the nature of the MPR hedge is quite different from that of the IR
hedge. The latter is a product of two simple terms: one that depends on the current
level of the agent’s effective risk aversion, another given by the market value of the
(discounted) cumulative interest rate volatility, normalized by the stock volatility. In
particular, if the interest rate is procyclical, the IR hedge is positive (negative) when
effective risk aversion is below (above) 1.17 Furthermore, the IR hedges of two CRRA
agents differ only by a constant multiple.18
The MPR hedge is more complex. It is determined by joint fluctuations of the
discounted future MPR with agent-specific characteristics: his future wealth net of his
absolute risk tolerance. Suppose for simplicity that the interest rate is constant. We can
then write (14) as
er(T−t) σSt Wk t pi
MPR hedge
k t = −CovQt (λ(t , T ) , Wk T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth hedge
+ CovQt (λ(t , T ) , Rk T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk tolerance hedge
. (16)
The first term on the right-hand side is the covariance of agent’s wealth with the (dis-
counted) MPR. We will refer to it as the wealth hedge. Similarly, the second term will
be referred to as the risk tolerance hedge.
To understand the nature of the wealth hedge, suppose that the future MPR
and the agent’s wealth are positively correlated. When the agent’s wealth is low, any
17Detemple, Garcia and Rindisbacher (2003) derive an analogous result in a partial equilibrium setting
for a class of multi-dimensional diffusion state variables.
18By (13), γkt = γk if agent k has a CRRA utility. This also follows from a simple homogeneity
argument.
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additional unit of wealth is valuable. Since MPR is also low in those states, the agent
invests more in the risk-free asset because it offers a better hedge against the low-wealth
states. This generates a negative hedging demand. When the agent’s wealth is high, the
utility of receiving an additional unit of wealth is low. therefore, even though the MPR
is high in those states, it does not make the risky asset that much more attractive. 19
To illustrate the intuition behind the risk tolerance hedge, suppose that the MPR
and risk tolerance are positively correlated. Then when risk tolerance is high, the agent
is willing to take more risk, and this effect is magnified since the MPR is high in those
states, driving up the demand for stock. When risk tolerance is low, the MPR is also
low. This generates an incentive to hedge against those states and to reduce the long
position in the stock, but not to sell short excessively, because of low risk tolerance. As
a consequence, stock investment is altogether more attractive (the impact of the states
with high MPR and high risk tolerance prevails) and this generates a positive hedging
demand.20
If we adopt Arrow’s hypothesis that absolute risk aversion is monotonically de-
creasing in wealth, risk tolerance Rk T = Rk(Wk T ) is increasing in wealth and, generally
speaking, the wealth hedge and the risk tolerance hedge will have opposite signs and
represent competing effects for determining the size of the hedging demand. Note also
that if the agent’s utility is of the CARA (exponential) class, Rk T is constant and,
consequently, the risk tolerance hedge vanishes.
If agent k has a HARA utility, we have
Rk T = aWk T + b
for some constants a, b and the MPR hedge takes the form
er(T−t) σSt Wk t pi
MPR hedge
k t = (a − 1) CovQt (λ(t , T ) , Wk T ) .
This formula generates the empirical prediction that MPR hedges are driven by the co-
movement of the agent’s wealth with the discounted MPR. This prediction can be tested
using PSID data (see Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008).
One also could use this formula together with the empirical state price density
method of Rosenberg and Engle (2002) to estimate the empirical optimal hedging port-
folio.
19The argument for the case of negative correlation between wealth and the MPR is analogous.
20The case in which the MPR and risk tolerance are negatively correlated is analogous.
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6 Monotonicity of Optimal Portfolios in Risk Aversion
A cornerstone of the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion is that in the standard one-
period portfolio allocation problem with one risky and one risk-free asset, the fraction
of wealth invested in the risky asset is monotonically decreasing in risk aversion.21
Monotonicity of optimal portfolios in risk aversion is also crucial for understanding
the nature of risk-sharing in dynamic general equilibrium models. In fact, almost all
existing papers on heterogeneous equilibria conjecture this monotonicity property and
use it as the basis for their economic intuition, arguing that more-risk-averse agents will
hold less stock and lend money to the less-risk-averse ones. (See Dumas 1989, Wang
1996, Basak and Cuoco 1998, Basak 2005, Bhamra and Uppal 2009). It is therefore
surprising that over the past 30 years, there has been no progress in extending the Arrow-
Pratt monotonicity result to a multi-period setting, neither in partial nor in general
equilibrium. The goal of this section is to address this deficiency. We obtain strong
sufficient conditions for the monotonicity of optimal portfolios in risk aversion that are
generally applicable and, we believe, are tight.
Of course, one cannot expect the Arrow-Pratt monotonicity result to hold in a
general multi-period setting. Even in the case when returns are independent over time
and the portfolio choice problem is myopic, stochastic future returns have a “background
risk” effect on the agent’s value function.22 In particular, an ordering of risk aversions
γi and γj by no means implies the same ordering of the effective risk aversions γit and
γjt . In order to formulate conditions guaranteeing this ordering of risk aversions, we will
need a definition due to Ross (1981).
Definition 6.1 (Ross (1981)) For agent i, we denote
γinfi
def
= inf
x
γi(x) , γ
sup
i
def
= sup
x
γi(x) .
Agent i is more risk averse than agent j in the sense of Ross, if
γinfi ≥ γsupj .
In this case we write γi ≥R γj.
21See Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
22Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Gollier and Pratt (1995) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002).
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Now, by (13),
γit =
Wit
EQt [e
− R Tt rsds γ−1iT WiT ] =
EQt [e
− R Tt rsdsWiT ]
EQt [e
− R Tt rsds γ−1iT WiT ] ∈ [γ
inf
i , γ
sup
i ] .
We arrive at
Proposition 6.2 If γi ≥R γj then γit ≥ γjt .
Thus, when stock returns are independent, the ordering of risk aversions in the
sense of Ross implies the corresponding ordering of optimal myopic portfolio weights.
However, when the investment opportunity set is stochastic, optimal portfolios are non-
myopic and contain a highly nontrivial hedging component, whose dependence on risk
aversion is by no means obvious. The presence of this hedging demand may completely
change portfolio behavior.23 It is therefore crucial to identify conditions concerning the
nature of stochastic fluctuations in the investment opportunity under which the natural
risk-taking behavior is preserved. There are three fundamental sources of these stochas-
tic fluctuations: stochastic volatility σDt , stochastic interest rates rt, and the stochastic
rate of macroeconomic fluctuation ρt. When ρt is constant, it turns out that optimal
portfolio weights are always monotonically decreasing in risk aversion. This follows from
the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3 Suppose that the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation ρt is constant. Then
optimal portfolio weights are monotonically decreasing in risk aversion in the sense of
Ross.
The result of Theorem 6.3 is quite general, as it imposes absolutely no constraints
on the nature of the agent’s utility function, MPR λT , and dividend volatility σ(DT ). If
the MPR λT is stochastic, Theorem 5.2 implies that optimal portfolios have nonmyopic
components that are not necessarily monotonic in risk aversion. Nevertheless, the mono-
tonicity of the myopic component fully compensates for the possible nonmonotonicity of
the nonmyopic components.
Another important case in which the monotonicity result holds is when risk aver-
sions of the two agents are on different sides of 1. Using the fact that the log agent
is myopic and always holds an instantaneously mean-variance efficient portfolio pilog t =
(σSt )
−1λt, it is possible to show that the following is true.24
23A simple Example B.3 in the Appendix shows that nonmyopic portfolios are generally not monotonic
in risk aversion even in simple two-period binomial models.
24The proof follows directly from Proposition B.1 in the appendix.
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Proposition 6.4 Suppose that γi ≤R 1 ≤R γj. Then
piit ≥ pilog t ≥ pijt.
Thus, when risk aversions are on different sides of 1, the monotonicity result holds
independently of the model parameters. However, when risk aversions are both on the
same side of 1, and the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation ρt is stochastic, stronger
conditions about the joint variation of the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation and the
MPR λT need to be imposed, as in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5 Suppose that one of the following is true:
(i) γi ≥R γj ≥ 1 and both −ρt and λT are countercyclical;
(ii) 1 ≥ γi ≥R γj and both −ρt and λT are procyclical.
Then agent i’s portfolio weight is smaller than agent j’s.
To gain intuition about how optimal portfolio behavior depends on the joint dy-
namics of ρt and λT , recall that by (16), the nonmyopic value of the stock investment for
an agent is determined by the future co-movement of the MPR with the agent’s wealth
and risk tolerance. If agent i′s wealth net of his risk tolerance (i.e., WiT −RiT ) co-moves
more strongly with the future market price of risk than that of agent j, he will hold a
larger fraction of wealth in the nonmyopic portfolio. The latter may happen even if agent
i is more risk-averse than agent j. Thus, there will be two competing effects, determining
the total size of investment and it is a priori unclear which effect dominates. Suppose
for simplicity that both agents k = i , j are CRRA agents with γi > γj > 1. Introduce
an agent-specific probability measure25
dQk
def
=
e−
R T
t r(Ds)dsWk T
EQ
[
e−
R T
t r(Ds)dsWk T
] dQ .
By construction, this measure assigns weights to various states of the world according to
the size of the agent’s discounted wealth e−
R T
t r(Ds)dsWk T in those states. Using Theorem
5.2, it is possible to show that
σSt pik t = −
(
1− γ−1k
)
EQkt [λ(t, T ) ] + λt . (17)
25Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2010) call this measure the agent k’s “wealth forward measure”.
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Thus, the size of agent i’s optimal portfolio is driven by two effects: the size of his risk
aversion γk and the size of the expectation of the discounted MPR λ(t , T ) under the
agent-specific measure Qk. This expectation precisely captures the nonmyopic nature
of the portfolio weight pik t. Since measure Q
k assigns larger weight to those states in
which agent i′s wealth is large, it will be larger for an agent whose wealth more strongly
co-varies with the discounted market price of risk. Since the markets are complete,
wealth Wk T = Ik(yk ξT ) = (yk U
′(DT ))−γ
−1
k is monotonically increasing in DT , and the
sensitivity of Wk T to changes in DT is determined by the risk tolerance γ
−1
k . Thus, when
γk is low, the wealth Wk T will be very sensitive to changes in DT and, consequently, is
highly procyclical. Therefore, agent k will bet on the realization of states with very high
DT and the measure Q
k will put great weight on those states. For this reason, if λ(t , T )
is countercyclical, its expectation EQ
k
[λ(t , T )] is monotonically increasing in γk
26 and
therefore
1− γ−1i
1− γ−1j
> 1 >
E
Qj
t [λ(t, T ) ]
EQit [λ(t, T ) ]
. (18)
The claim of Theorem 6.5 follows then from (18) and (17).
By contrast, when λ(t , T ) is procyclical, its expectation EQ
k
[λ(t , T )] is monoton-
ically decreasing in γk because agents with low risk aversion bet on the realization of
states with high DT and, consequently, high λ(t , T ) .
7 The Sign of the Hedging Demand
As discussed above, the exact behavior of nonmyopic optimal portfolios depends on the
cyclicality of the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation ρt and the MPR λT . In this section
we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the positivity of MPR hedging demand,
depending only on the properties of the agent’s utility function and cyclicality of ρt and
λT .
Recall that the absolute prudence and absolute risk tolerance of agent k are defined
as
Pk(x) = −u
′′′
k (x)
u′′k(x)
and Rk(x) = −u
′
k(x)
u′′k(x)
respectively. The following is true:
Theorem 7.1 Suppose that both −ρt and λT are countercyclical (procyclical) and that
r′ is not too large. Then the MPR hedging component piMPR hedget is positive if and only
26This heuristic argument is made rigorous in the proof of Theorem 6.5 in the Appendix.
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if the product of prudence and risk tolerance is below (above) 2 27, that is
Pk(x)Rk(x) ≤ 2 for all x.
The result of Theorem 7.1 is somewhat unexpected at first glance. Since the
optimal portfolio of a log investor is always myopic, one would expect that the sign of
the hedging component depends only on whether risk aversion is above or below 1 (as
it does for the IR hedging component). However, Theorem 7.1 shows that the hedging
motive depends on properties of three derivatives of the utility function.
To understand the economic mechanisms behind Theorem 7.1, consider the case
when both −ρt and λT are countercyclical and suppose for simplicity that rt = r is
constant. Recall the expression (16):
er(T−t) σSt Wk t pi
MPR hedge
k t = −CovQt
(
λ(t , T ) , (Wk T − Rk T )
)
.
Since markets are complete, Wk T is increasing in DT and, consequently, the wealth hedge
−CovQt (λ(t , T ) , Wk T ) is positive. The size of the risk tolerance hedge depends on the
cyclical properties of the agent’s risk tolerance Rk T . A direct calculation shows that
d
dx
Rk(x) = −1 + Pk(x)Rk(x).
If the product Pk Rk is large, the risk tolerance Rk T is highly sensitive to wealth fluctu-
ations and, consequently, is highly procyclical. Then the risk tolerance hedge
CovQt
(
λ(t , T ) , Rk T
)
is very negative and dominates the wealth hedge,
−CovQt
(
λ(t , T ) , Wk T
)
and the MPR hedge is negative. By contrast, if Pk Rk is small, the risk tolerance hedge is
not very negative. Therefore, the wealth hedge dominates and the MPR hedge is positive.
The threshold of 2 appears because Wk T − Rk(Wk T ) is monotonically increasing in Wk T
if and only if Pk Rk ≤ 2.
The assumption of countercyclical MPR is natural and strong empirical evidence
supports it (See Campbell and Cochrane 1999). Furthermore, the countercyclical MPR
27Note that the product of prudence and risk tolerance is exactly 2 for the log investor, for whom the
hedging portfolio is zero.
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can be generated from simple microeconomic assumptions about individual agents’ pref-
erences.28 Since this study is the first to introduce the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation,
there are no empirical data about the behavior of ρt. We believe this is an important
question deserving a serious empirical analysis. Note also that, in the benchmark case
when ρt is constant (see Corollary 3.2), this issue does not arise.
The appearance of prudence is also related to precautionary savings. As Kimball
(1990) showed in a static, one-period model, the strength of the precautionary savings
motive for an agent anticipating stochastic fluctuations in future income is determined
by his prudence Pk. Here, Pk plays a similar role, determining the strength of the sav-
ings/investment motive for an agent who anticipates future changes in the stochastic
investment opportunity set.
If we consider the Arrow (1965) hypothesis that γk(x) is increasing, a direct cal-
culation shows that it holds if and only if xPk(x) ≤ γk(x) + 1 . If γk(x) ≥ 1, we get
Pk(x)Rk(x) = xPk(x)/γk(x) ≤ 2. Theorem 7.1 then implies the following
Corollary 7.2 Let −ρt and λT be countercyclical. Suppose that γk(x) ≥ 1 and is
increasing and r′ is not excessively large. Then the MPR hedge is positive.
For the benchmark CRRA utility, Pk Rk = 1 + γ
−1
k and the results take a simpler
form
Corollary 7.3 Suppose that γk = const, r
′ is not excessively large, and both −ρt and λT
are countercyclical. Then the MPR hedge is positive if and only if γk ≥ 1 .
The intuition behind Corollary 7.3 is as follows. The marginal utility u′k(x) = x
−γk
of an agent with high risk aversion γk > 1 is high in bad states (low Dt). Therefore, any
additional unit of consumption in those states is highly valuable for him. Since the MPR
is countercyclical, it is high in bad states. This makes the stock a highly attractive
instrument for agent k to hedge against those states and induces him to buy additional
shares. On the other hand, an agent with low risk aversion γk < 1 is not “afraid” of the
bad states and bets on the realization of good states with high Dt. Since the MPR is
low in those states, it is optimal for him to sell some of his stock holdings, creating a
negative hedging demand.
28See Proposition 9.3 below.
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8 Equilibrium Dynamics
8.1 Setup
In this section, we study implications of the agent’s nonmyopic portfolio behavior for
equilibrium dynamics. We assume that DT is the terminal dividend of the single risky
asset in positive net supply and there are no intermediate dividends.
There are K competitive agents behaving rationally. Agent k is initially endowed
with ψk > 0 shares of stock, and the total supply of the stock is normalized to 1,
K∑
k=1
ψk = 1 .
Agent k chooses portfolio strategy pik t, the portfolio weight at time t in the risky asset,
as to maximize expected utility29
E [uk(Wk T )]
of the terminal wealth WkT . As usual, we say that the market is in equilibrium if the
agents behave optimally and both the risky asset market and the risk-free market clear.
It is well known that the above financial market is dynamically complete if the
volatility process σSt of the stock price is almost surely nonzero.
30 Because of the market
completeness, any equilibrium allocation is Pareto-efficient and can be characterized as
an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (See Duffie and Huang 1986, Wang 1996).31
Since in equilibrium the final wealth amounts of all agents must sum up to the
aggregate dividend, equilibrium state price density ξT is uniquely determined by the
consumption market clearing equation
K∑
k=1
Ik(yk ξT ) = DT . (19)
29We assume that uk is C3(R+) and satisfies standard Inada conditions.
30This can be verified under some technical regularity conditions on the model primitives. See
Hugonnier, Malamud, and Trubowitz (2009).
31Since endowments are colinear (all agents hold shares of the same single stock), it can be shown
that under some conditions on the agents’ utility functions, the equilibrium is in fact unique up to
a multiplicative factor, and also is unique if we fix the risk-free rate. See Dana (1995, 2001). If the
dividend is neither bounded away from zero nor from infinity, additional care is needed to verify the
existence of equilibrium. See Dana (2001) and Malamud (2008). We implicitly assume throughout the
paper that an equilibrium exists.
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It is important to mention that the model with a finite terminal horizon should be
seen as an abstraction and that we should be careful interpreting it. St is seen as the
price of a stock whose first dividend is paid at time T , or at a later period. In equilibrium,
ST = DT and therefore DT is just the stock price at time T. Furthermore, σ
D(DT ) is the
local volatility and can be estimated directly from the prices of options with maturity
T, using Dupire’s formula (see Dumas, Fleming, and Whaley 1998). Finally, the agent’s
utilities uk from terminal wealth could be thought of as their effective utilities (value
functions), derived from consumption after time T.
8.2 Equilibrium Stock Price Volatility
Unlike the MPR, the stock price volatility is a nonmyopic object. It depends not only on
the size of the aggregate risk but also on its future fluctuations relative to other variables.
More precisely, the following is true:
Theorem 8.1 The equilibrium stock price volatility is given by
σSt = σ
myopic
t + σ
nonmyopic
t − EQt
[ ∫ T
t
σr(t , s) ds
]
,
where32
σnonmyopict = −
1
St
CovQt
( (
λ(t , T ) − σD(t , T ) ) , e− R Tt r(Ds)dsDT ) . (20)
Furthermore, σSt is positive if r
′ is sufficiently small (the interest rate is not highly pro-
cyclical).
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 8.1, we first discuss our benchmark
extension of Merton’s CAPM when r, γU are constant, and the log dividend follows the
autoregressive process (6). Then σD and the rate ρt = b are constant and the nonmyopic
volatility σnonmyopict vanishes. Consequently, by Theorems 4.2 and 8.1, the risk-return
tradeoff coincides with that of Merton’s CAPM:
λt = γ σ
S
t .
However, the stock volatility does not coincide with the fundamental dividend volatility.
Rather, we have
σS = σmyopict = e
−b(T−t)σD .
32We use CovQt (X,Y ) to denote conditional covariance of random variables X and Y under the
equilibrium risk-neutral measure Q.
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Stock volatility is higher than the dividend volatility if the log dividend is nonstationary
(b < 0) and lower if the log dividend is stationary and mean-reverting (b > 0), because
stock price volatility is the sensitivity of expected future dividends to changes in Dt, as
seen from (22) below. This sensitivity is large (small) if the log dividend is nonstationary
(stationary). See also the discussion after Theorem 4.2.
If the interest rate is constant, expression (20) implies that the spread between the
stock price volatility and the myopic volatility is given by the covariance of the discounted
future aggregate dividend with the future discounted MPR net of the discounted future
dividend volatility. The term “nonmyopic” is most easily justified if we recall that
λ(t , T ) − σD(t , T ) = (γU(DT ) − 1)σD(t , T ) . (21)
Formulae (21) and (20) imply that, generically, the nonmyopic volatility vanishes if
and only if γU ≡ 1. That is, precisely when the representative agent is completely
myopic. Hence, the nature of the nonmyopic volatility is necessarily driven by the agents’
nonmyopic equilibrium behavior. When MPR is stochastic, nonmyopic agents increase or
decrease their stock holdings depending on the expected future fluctuations of the MPR.
The equilibrium hedging demand raises or decreases the total equilibrium demand for
stocks and therefore drives the equilibrium stock price up or down. Since Dt is the
single state variable in our model, standard results imply that St = S(t,Dt) is a smooth
function33 of Dt, and therefore, by Ito’s formula, we get
σSt = σ
D(Dt)Dt
∂
∂Dt
logS(t,Dt) . (22)
Thus, stock price volatility is nothing but the sensitivity of the stock price to changes
in the dividend. Since equilibrium optimal portfolios respond to changes in Dt in a
nonmyopic way, so does the equilibrium stock price, giving rise to nonmyopic volatility.
Formula (20) for the nonmyopic volatility is similar to the formula for the forward-
futures spread, which says that the forward-futures spread is given by the covariance
under the risk-neutral measure of the future payoff with the cumulative return on short-
term bonds (the bank account). As has been recognized in the literature, such a rep-
resentation immediately generates two empirical predictions for the spread: (1) a weak
prediction that the sign of the spread should coincide with the sign of the covariance, and
(2) a strong prediction that the variation in the spread is explained by the covariance
(see Meulbroek 1992). Based on formula (20), we can make analogous predictions for
33Under some technical conditions. See Hugonnier, Malamud, and Trubowitz (2009).
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the dynamics of the nonmyopic volatility and the co-movement of the dividends with the
discounted MPR λ(t, T ) net of the discounted dividend volatility σD(t, T ).
There is also a clear similarity between expressions (14) and (20) for the MPR
hedge and the nonmyopic volatility respectively. In fact, the hedging demand (14) is the
source of nonmyopic volatility (20). Both arise as a nonmyopic response to the future
fluctuations of the MPR. Similar to (20), expression (14) does not directly depend on
the utility function of the representative agent. Therefore, Theorem 8.1 also has direct
implications for the dynamics of the risk-return tradeoff. Empirical evidence suggests
that expected stock returns are weakly related to volatility. The results of Gennotte and
Marsh (1993), Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) and Harvey (2001) suggest that
the relation between expected returns and volatility is highly complex and nonlinear.
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is equilibrium hedging behavior. Suppose
for simplicity that the risk aversion γU = γ of the representative agent and the interest
rate r are constant. Then by a fundamental result of Merton (1973), we have
λt = γ (σ
S
t + λ
hedge
t )
where λhedget is the so-called hedge component appearing due to the equilibrium hedging
demand. Theorems 4.2 and 8.1 imply that λhedget = −σnonmyopict , providing a direct
economic interpretation for Merton’s hedge component. Furthermore, when interest rate
r is constant, the risk-return relation is driven by the nonlinear relation between myopic
and nonmyopic volatility,
λt
σSt
= γ
σmyopict
σmyopict + σ
nonmyopic
t
. (23)
Thus, calculating the risk-return tradeoff amounts to calculating the ratio of the
nonmyopic and the myopic volatility. One can explore empirically this ratio using rep-
resentations (8) and (20). It is particularly convenient that the latter does not explicitly
depend on the utility of the representative agent and can be directly estimated from data
using the empirical state price density (see Rosenberg and Engle 2002).
9 Market Price of Risk Counter-cyclicality and Excess Volatil-
ity
To address further dynamic properties of equilibrium, we will need to make additional
assumptions about the evolution of Dt. It has become common in the literature to use
25
consumption volatility as a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. There is empirical
evidence that macroeconomic uncertainty is countercyclical (see French and Sichel 1993
and Kim et al. 2009).
Definition 9.1 We say that our model exhibits countercyclical macroeconomic uncer-
tainty if the dividend volatility σDt is countercyclical and the rate of macroeconomic fluc-
tuation ρt is procyclical.
This definition is natural because volatility σD and −ρt determine respectively the
size and the speed of macroeconomic fluctuation. From now on we make the following:
Assumption 9.2 The economy exhibits countercyclical macroeconomic uncertainty, and
the aggregate risk aversion γU is countercyclical.
By Definition 3.1, the economy exhibits countercyclical macroeconomic uncertainty
if and only if logDt = f(At) where f is increasing and concave and the process At
has constant volatility and concave drift. For example, a simple family of such processes
arises when
dAt = (a − bAt) dt + σ dBt.
and the dividend process is given by Dt = e
f(At) for some increasing and concave function
f.
The assumption of countercyclical risk aversion is natural, and strong empirical
evidence supports it (See Campbell and Cochrane 1999). Furthermore, countercyclical
aggregate risk aversion can be generated from simple microeconomic assumptions about
individual agents’ preferences. In fact, it is known that if all agents in the economy
have (heterogeneous) CRRA preferences the representative agent’s utility will have a de-
creasing (i.e., countercyclical) relative risk aversion (DRRA) (see Benninga and Mayshar
2000 and Cvitanic´ and Malamud 2010b). A modification of the arguments from the latter
paper also implies that the following slight generalization is true:
Proposition 9.3 If all agents have DRRA preferences, the aggregate risk aversion is
countercyclical.
In fact, it is possible to show that Proposition 9.3 still holds if individual risk aversions
are sufficiently heterogeneous and “not too increasing”.
It is a conventional wisdom that countercyclical risk aversion generates counter-
cyclical MPR.34 The following result confirms this intuition.
34See Campbell and Cochrane (1999). There is also empirical evidence supporting countercyclicality
of both MPR and aggregate risk aversion. See Fama and French (1989) and Ferson and Harvey (1991).
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Proposition 9.4 Under Assumption 9.2, the MPR is countercyclical if both r′ and r′′
are sufficiently small.35
When the interest rate rt = r is constant and the dividend follows a geometric
Brownian motion, He and Leland (1993) showed that the MPR is countercyclical if
the aggregate risk aversion is countercyclical. Proposition 9.4 provides general sufficient
conditions for the MPR countercyclicality. These conditions are tight in that a sufficiently
countercyclical rate of macroeconomic fluctuation can generate procyclical behavior in
MPR even if the dividend volatility is constant and risk aversion is countercyclical.
The requirement that r′ and r′′ be small is not overly restrictive, given that, empiri-
cally, interest rate volatility is very small, especially relative to stock volatility. However,
from a theoretical perspective, it is interesting that the effect of stochastic interest rates
on the MPR might lead to unexpected equilibrium dynamics if countercyclicality of the
aggregate risk aversion is not sufficiently strong. Consider, for example, the case when
γU = γ is constant and the dividend is GBM. In this case the MPR is given by
λt = σ
(
γ − EQt
[ ∫ T
t
r′(Dτ )Dτ dτ
])
.
Consequently, the dynamics of the MPR are determined exclusively by the interest rate
process. If r′(Dt)Dt is larger than γ with high probability, the MPR may become
negative because bond prices become so countercyclical that investors are eager to buy
stock for hedging purposes even if the stock offers a negative excess return. Furthermore,
if r′(Dt)Dt is decreasing in Dt, the MPR becomes procyclical.
By Proposition 9.4, countercyclical macroeconomic uncertainty together with coun-
tercyclical risk aversion generates countercyclical dynamics of MPR. The latter dynamics,
in turn, determine the sign of nonmyopic volatility, as can be seen from expression (20)
and the definition of λ(t, T ). More precisely, we arrive at the following result:
Proposition 9.5 Under Assumption 9.2, the nonmyopic volatility is positive if γU ≥ 1
and r′ is sufficiently small.
The reasoning behind this result is as follows. Under Assumption 9.2, the MPR
is low in good states, but the future aggregate risk aversion is also (relatively) low and
the expected future dividends are high. Therefore, the agent is willing to hold the stock
35In fact, we show that the following is true: for any interval [d1, d2] ⊂ R+ there exists an ε > 0 such
that λt is monotonically decreasing in Dt in the interval, as long as r′ < ε and |r′′| < ε.
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despite low MPR. This makes the price rise in good states and, by similar arguments,
decline in bad states, driving up the nonmyopic part of the price volatility. Put differently,
the tension between the movements in future dividends and the MPR creates nonmyopic
(excess) volatility, because the larger the dividend, the larger the demand for the stock,
while at the same time the lower the MPR , the lower the demand. The requirement
that r′ be not excessively large is important: if the interest rate is highly procyclical,
discounted dividends e−
R T
t rs dsDT may exhibit countercyclical behavior, which, by (20),
gives rise to a negative nonmyopic volatility.
The nonmyopic volatility is the natural analog of excess volatility for the case of
stochastic dividend risk.36 Our representation illustrates that dynamical properties of
aggregate risk aversion and dividend volatility by themselves are not sufficient to generate
excess volatility and the outcome is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the rate of
macroeconomic fluctuation. This result should be contrasted with a related result of
Bhamra and Uppal (2009). They analyze equilibrium with two CRRA agents and a GBM
dividend and show that the stock price volatility is higher than the dividend volatility if
the agent’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is not too large. Their model
differs from ours because they allow for intermediate consumption, therefore, the interest
rate is determined endogenously by the agents’ EIS.37 Our volatility representation for the
nonmyopic (excess) volatility (see Theorem 8.1) allows us to view the result of Bhamra
and Uppal (2009) from a different perspective. Two sources generate deviations from
fundamental (myopic) volatility in their model. Countercyclical MPR drives up the
nonmyopic volatility, whereas the procyclical risk-free rate drives down the volatility,
and the constraint of EIS being not too large diminishes the second effect.
36Stock prices are said to exhibit excess volatility if they are substantially more volatile than the
underlying dividends. Excess volatility is a well known stylized fact. See Shiller (1981), LeRoy and
Porter (1981), Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1985, 1991) and West (1988).
37The simplifying assumption of no intermediate consumption is frequently used in equilibrium asset
pricing literature, including the Sharpe and Lintner’s CAPM. See Bick (1990), He and Leland (1993),
Grossman and Zhou (1996), Kogan et al. (2006). Since agents do not have to substitute consumption for
investment, the interest rate process is not determined in equilibrium and can be specified exogenously.
This allows the isolation of interest rate effects on the equilibrium dynamics. One can contrast this to
production economies, in which the MPR is specified exogenously and only the interest rate is determined
in equilibrium. See Dumas (1989).
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Another important consequence of Proposition 9.5 and Theorem 4.2 is that, under
their assumptions, the following risk-return inequality38 holds:
λt < σ
S
t max
x
γU(x) . (24)
The reason is that MPR is driven by myopic volatility, which is smaller than the stock
volatility by Theorem 8.1 and Proposition 9.5. Because of its myopic nature, equilibrium
MPR “underestimates” the true stock price volatility and is unable to account for future
stock price and return fluctuations. Since MPR is countercyclical, the stock is cheap in
bad states (those with low Dt) and offers a high instantaneous return. This motivates the
agents to buy more shares in those states, and the stock becomes more volatile, which,
in turn, stabilizes the demand. A similar argument applies in good states. Risk-return
inequality is a much weaker requirement than the risk-return equality of Merton (1973),
and we can use it together with empirical data to estimate the maximal risk aversion in
the economy.
9.1 Example: Mean-Reverting Dividends and CRRA agents
We now illustrate the results from the previous sections in our benchmark example. That
is, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 9.6 The log dividend At = logDt follows an autoregressive process
dAt = (a− bAt)dt + σ dBt ,
interest rate r is 0, and all agents in the economy have CRRA preferences, γk(x) = γk.
Under Assumption 9.6, σD = σ, c = b. Consequently, all the formulae substan-
tially simplify and all the dynamic properties of equilibrium are determined solely by the
properties of the aggregate risk aversion γU . The following proposition summarizes our
main results:
Proposition 9.7 Under Assumption 9.6,
(1) MPR
λt = E
Q
t [ γ
U(DT ) ] e
−b (T−t) σ
is countercyclical;
38This is indirectly related to the state price density inequality of Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
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(2) the stock volatility is given by
σSt = σ e
−b (T−t) + σnonmyopict ,
where the nonmyopic (excess) volatility
σnonmyopict = −
e−b (T−t) σ
St
CovQt (λT , DT )
is always positive;
(3) optimal portfolios are monotonically decreasing in risk aversion. They are given by
pik t =
λt
γk σSt
+ pihedgingk t ,
where the hedging component
pihedgingk t =
1
Wk t
(γ−1k − 1)
e−b (T−t) σ
σSt
CovQt (λT , Wk T )
is positive if and only if γk > 1.
We conclude this section with another interesting result related to heterogeneity
in risk aversions, showing how the size of the risk-return tradeoff, the size of the ratio
σSt /σ
myopic
t and the size of the equilibrium optimal portfolios depends on the magnitude
of heterogeneity. Let
γ
def
= min
k
γk , Γ
def
= max
k
γk.
Proposition 9.8 The following is true:
(1) the MPR satisfies
γ σ e−b(T−t) ≤ λt ≤ Γσ e−b (T−t) ;
(2) the stock volatility satisfies
σ e−b(T−t) ≤ σSt ≤ σ e−b(T−t)
(
1 + Γ − γ) ;
(3) the risk-return tradeoff satisfies
γ
1 + Γ − γ ≤
λt
σSt
≤ Γ ; (25)
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(4) the optimal portfolios satisfy
1
γk
γ
1 + Γ − γ ≤ pik t ≤
1
γk
(
Γ + (γk − 1) (Γ − γ)
)
if γk > 1 ,
1
γk
γ
1 + Γ − γ ≤ pik t ≤
1
γk
Γ if γk < 1 .
These results imply that the size Γ − γ of heterogeneity plays a crucial role for
determining the size of excess volatility, risk-return tradeoff, and the size of equilibrium
optimal portfolios. In the terminology of Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), investors
are taking advantage of heterogeneous risk attitudes in the economy, which generates
excess volatility and stochastic fluctuations of the MPR.
It follows from the asymptotic results of Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2010b) that the
bounds (25) and (26) are tight. Therefore, they are especially useful for empirical analysis
because they do not depend on the parameters of the dividend process. For example,
finding the empirical range [
min
λt
σSt
, max
λt
σSt
]
of the risk-return tradeoff allows us to gauge the size Γ − γ of heterogeneity in the
economy. Moreover, given the estimates for γ and Γ from risk-return tradeoffs, data
on empirical portfolio holdings together with bounds (26) could be used to study the
cross-sectional distribution of risk aversions in the economy.
10 Conclusions
We study nonmyopic optimal portfolios in viable markets, characterized by the fact that
the state price density and the interest rate are deterministic functions of the single diffu-
sion state variable. Our analysis is based on new representations for optimal portfolios in
terms of expected values and covariances of directly observable quantities under the risk-
neutral measure. In these representations, macroeconomic risks are priced discounted at
a specific rate, that we call the “rate of macroeconomic fluctuation”. Our representations
are universal because they hold in any exchange economy with an arbitrary Markovian
dividend, arbitrary stochastic interest rates, and, in the equilibrium context, arbitrary
rational agents maximizing utility from terminal consumption.
We derive tight conditions for the monotonicity of optimal portfolios in risk aversion
and the positivity of the MPR hedge. In particular, we show that the MPR hedge consists
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of two components, the wealth hedge and the risk tolerance hedge. Those are determined
respectively by the covariances of agent’s future wealth and future risk tolerance with
future MPR, discounted at the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation. The latter can be
directly estimated from data, because the drift of the MPR is equal to the product of
the MPR and its volatility plus the rate of macroeconomic fluctuation.
Our results highlight general mechanisms behind the phenomena of MPR counter-
cyclicality, nonmyopic (excess) volatility, and nonmyopic optimal portfolios. In particu-
lar, we show that the nonmyopic volatility is determined by the interplay between the
MPR and interest rate cyclicality, that the size and the sign of the interest rate hedge are
determined by the interest rate volatility and the size of agent’s risk aversion, whereas
the size and the sign of MPR hedge are determined by the interplay between prudence
and risk tolerance.
We believe our results are important for understanding single-agent (partial equilib-
rium) nonmyopic portfolio behavior and for understanding continuous-time equilibrium
CAPM. They can be used in theory for testing various versions of CAPM and in practice
for calculating optimal portfolios for long-run investors.
Appendix
A Proofs: Stock Price Dynamics
Denote by Dt the Malliavin derivative operator. 39 The following is the main technical
result of the paper.
39For an expedient introduction to Malliavin derivatives, see Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher
(2003).
32
Proposition A.1 The drift and volatility of the stock price are given by
µSt = r(Dt) + σ
S
t
(
EQt
[
γU(DT ) (DtDT )/DT
]
−
∫ T
t
EQt [r
′(Ds) (DtDs)] ds
)
,
σSt =
1
Et[ξT DT ]
Et[(1− γU(DT )ξTDtDT )]
−
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
+ Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsDtξT
]
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT
] ,
(26)
and the optimal portfolio of agent k is given by
pik t =
1
σSt
Et [Dt ξT (yk ξT I ′k(yk ξT ) + Ik(yk ξT ))]
Et[ξT Ik(yk ξT )]
−
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
+ Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsDtξT
]
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT
] , (27)
where
DtDT = DtσD(Dt)eδT−δt (28)
with
δt =
∫ t
0
[Ds(µ
D)′(Ds)− 0.5(Ds(σD)′(Ds))2 −Ds(σD)′(Ds)σD(Ds)]ds
+
∫ t
0
Ds(σ
D)′(Ds)dBs (29)
and
DtξT = − 1
DT
γU(DT )ξTDtDT .
Proof of Proposition A.1. By definition,
ξt = e
− R t0 r(Ds)dsMt = e− R t0 r(Ds)dsEt[MT ] = Et[eR Tt r(Ds)ds ξT ] .
The price St and the wealth of agent k satisfy
logSt =
∫ t
0
r(Ds) ds + logEt[ξT DT ]− logEt[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ]
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and
logWk t =
∫ t
0
r(Ds) ds + logEt [ξT Ik(yk ξT )] − logEt[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ] .
We get the volatility σSt as the Malliavin derivative Dt logSt and we get σSt pik t as the
Malliavin derivative Dt logWk t. Thus, we have
pik t =
Dt logWk t
Dt logSt . (30)
We will now calculate the Malliavin derivatives. For process D, it is well known
that the Malliavin derivative
Yt := DtDu , u ≥ t
satisfies the linear stochastic differential equation
dYu = (Du(µ
D)′(Du) + µD(Du))Yu du + (Du(σD)′(Du) + σD(Du))Yu dBu , u ≥ t
with
Yt = Dtσ
D(Dt)
and (28) follows. Therefore,
DtξT = U ′′(DT )DtDT . (31)
Using the identity
DtEt[X] = Et[DtX]
we arrive at
Dt logWk t = 1
Et[ξT Ik(yk ξT )]
Et [ykξT I
′
k(yk ξT )DtξT + Ik(yk ξT )DtξT ]
−
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
+ Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsDtξT
]
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT
] (32)
and
Dt logSt = 1
Et[ξT DT ]
Et[DTDtξT + ξTDtDT ]
−
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
+ Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsDtξT
]
Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT
] . (33)
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It remains to show the expression for the drift. By the martingale property, we have
dEt[ξT DT ]
Et[ξT DT ]
= Ut dWt ,
dEt[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ]
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ]
= Vt dWt ,
where, by the Clarke-Ocone formula and (31),
Ut =
DtEt[ξT DT ]
Et[ξT DT ]
=
1
Et[ξT DT ]
E[ξT (1− γU(DT ))DtDT ]
and
Vt =
DtEt[e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsξT ]
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)dsξT ]
= −
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds (γU(DT )ξTDtDT )/DT ] − Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ]
.
(34)
Applying Ito’s formula, we get
d logSt = r(Dt) dt + d log
Et[ξT DT ]
Et[ξT ]
=
1
2
(2 r(Dt) + V
2
t − U2t ) dt + (Ut − Vt) dWt.
Therefore,
µSt = r(Dt) +
1
2
(V 2t − U2t + (Ut − Vt)2) = r(Dt) + Vt (Vt − Ut)
and thus, by (33),
µSt = r(Dt)
+
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds(γU(DT )ξTDtDT )/DT ] − Et
[
e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds
(∫ T
t
r′(Ds) (DtDs) ds
)
ξT
]
Et[e
R T
0 r(Ds)ds ξT ]
× Dt logSt
= r(Dt) + σ
S
t
(
EQt
[
γU(DT ) (DtDT )/DT
] − ∫ T
t
EQt [r
′(Ds) (DtDs)] ds
)
.
(35)
The following result allows us to rewrite the Malliavin derivative DtD without
involving stochastic integrals. It has also been proved by Detemple, Garcia, and Rindis-
bacher (2003) in a slightly different form, but we present a derivation here for the reader’s
convenience.
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Lemma A.2 We have
DtDT = DT σD(DT ) e−
R T
t ρs ds . (36)
Proof. By Ito’s formula,
log(DT σ
D(DT )) − log(Dt σD(Dt)) =
∫ T
t
(σD(Ds) +Ds (σ
D)′(Ds)) dBs
+
∫ T
t
(
(σD(Ds) +Ds (σ
D)′(Ds))σD(Ds)−1 µD(Ds)
)
ds
+
1
2
∫ T
t
(
(2(σD)′(Ds) +Ds(σD)′′(Ds))σD(Ds)
− (σD(Ds) + (Ds (σD)′(Ds))2)
)
ds.
(37)
It remains to show that
ρs = c(Ds)
where
c(x) = −x (µD)′(x) + x (σD)′(x)σD(x)−1 µD(x)
+ (σD)′(x)σD(x)x + 0.5 (σD)′′(x)x2 σD(x) .
(38)
This claim can be verified by direct calculation.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof follows directly by substituting (36) into
(26).
We will need the following known
Lemma A.3 For any one-dimensional diffusion, the function
G(t , x) = E[g(DT ) |Dt = x]
is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in x for all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if g(x) is mono-
tonically increasing (decreasing) in x. Furthermore, if both g(x) and h(x) are increasing
(or both decreasing), then
Et[g(DT )]Et[h(DT )] ≤ Et[g(DT )h(DT )].
If both g and h are strictly increasing (or both strictly decreasing), then the inequality is
also strict unless DT is constant. If one function is increasing and the other is decreasing,
the inequality reverses.
Proof. See Herbst and Pitt (1991).
36
Lemma A.4 Suppose that F and G1, · · · , GN are monotonically increasing functions.
Then for any N ∈ N and any {t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tN} ⊂ [t , T ],
E[F (XT )G1(Xt1) · · · GN(XtN ) |Xt = x]
is monotonically increasing in x and
Et[F (XT )G1(Xt1) · · · GN(XtN )] ≥ Et [F (XT ) ] Et [G1(Xt1) · · · GN(XtN ) ] .
Proof. The proof is by induction. For N = 1, we have
Et[F (XT )Gt1(Xt1)] = Et[Et1 [F (XT )]Gt1(Xt1)].
By Lemma A.3, the function inside the expectation is increasing in Xt1 and another
application of Lemma A.3 provides monotonicity of Et[F (XT )Gt1(Xt1)]. Now, by Lemma
A.3,
Et[Et1 [F (XT )]G1(Xt1)] ≥ Et[Et1 [F (XT )] ]Et[Gt1(Xt1)]
= Et[F (XT )]Et[Gt1(Xt1)] ,
(39)
and we are done. Suppose now that the claim has been proved for N. Then
Et[F (XT )G1(Xt1) · · · GN(XtN )]
= Et[G1(Xt1)Et1 [F (XT )G2(Xt2) · · · GN(XtN )] ]
≥ Et[Et1 [F (XT ) ]Et1 [G1(Xt1)G2(Xt2) · · · GN(XtN )] ]
(40)
and the claim follows from Lemma A.3 and the induction hypothesis.
Lemma A.5 Suppose that f and g are both increasing (decreasing). Then the following
is true:
(1) the function40
E
[
f(DT ) e
R T
t g(Ds) ds |Dt = x
]
is also monotonically increasing (decreasing);
(2) we have
Covt
(
h(DT ) , f(DT ) e
R T
t g(Ds) ds
)
≥ 0
if h has the same direction of monotonicity as f and g, and the inequality reverses
if h has the opposite direction of monotonicity.
40Item (1) of Lemma A.5 is contained in Mele (2007).
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Proof of Lemma A.5. The claim follows from Lemma A.4, approximating the
integral
∫ T
t
g(Ds) ds by discrete integral sums.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. The proof follows directly from Proposition A.1 and
(36). The fact that σSt > 0 when r
′ is sufficiently small follows from (2), Lemma A.5
and
σSt =
∂
∂Dt
S(t , Dt)σ
D(Dt) .
B Proofs: Optimal Portfolios
We start with the following auxiliary result:
Proposition B.1 The optimal portfolio pik t is given by
σSt pik t =
EQt
[
λ(t, T ) e−
R T
t r(Ds)dsWk T
(
γ−1k (Wk T ) − 1
)]
Wkt
+ λt . (41)
Proof of Proposition B.1. The claim follows directly from Proposition A.1
and (36).
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let t = 0 for simplicity. By definition, the value
function is
Uk(x) = E[uk(Ik(ξT yk)) ]
where yk = yk(x) solves
x = E[ξT Ik(ξT yk)].
Differentiating this identity, we get
y′k(x) = E[ξ
2
T I
′
k(ξT yk)]
−1
and therefore
U ′k(x) = E [u
′
k(Ik(ξT yk)) I
′
k(ξT yk) ξT ] y
′
k(x) = E [ ξT yk I
′
k(ξT yk) ξT ] y
′
k(x) = yk(x) .
Consequently,
U ′′k (x) = y
′
k(x) =
1
E[ξ2T I
′
k(ξTyk)]
and
γk0(x) = − x
yk E[ξ2T I
′
k(ξTyk)]
= − E[ξT Ik(ξTyk)]
E[ξ2T yk I
′
k(ξTyk)]
.
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Differentiating the identity
u′k(Ik(x)) = x
we get
I ′k(x) = (u
′′
k(x))
−1
and therefore
ykξT I
′
k(ykξT ) = − γ−1kTWk T .
Proof of Theorem 5.2. By Propositions B.1 and 5.1,
σSt pi
hedging
k t = σ
S
t
(
pik t − pimyopick t
)
=
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(t , T ) e−
R T
t rs dsWk T
(
γ−1kT − 1
)]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ] + λt
− λt E
Q
t [e
− R Tt rs ds γ−1kT Wk T ]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWk T ]
=
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(t , T ) e−
R T
t rs dsWk T
(
γ−1kT − 1
)]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ]
− λt E
Q
t [e
− R Tt rs ds (γ−1kT − 1)WkT ]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ]
=
1
EQt [Wk T ]
(
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(t , T ) e−
R T
t rs dsWk T
(
γ−1kT − 1
)]
− EQt [γU(DT )σD(t , T )]EQt [(γ−1kT − 1) e−
R T
t rs dsWk T ]
)
+
EQt [e
− R Tt rs ds (γ−1kT − 1)WkT ]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ] E
Q
t
[∫ T
t
σr(t, τ) dτ
]
,
(42)
Q.E.D.
Lemma B.2 Suppose γi(x) < a for some a > 0. Then there exists a smooth one-
parameter family of utilities u(x, β) such that u(x, 0) = ui(x), u(x, 1) = x
1−a/(1 − a)
and the function I(x, β)
def
= (u′(x, β))−1 is such that
−Ix(x, β)x
I(x, β)
is monotonically decreasing in β.
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Proof. A direct calculation shows that Ii(x) = (u
′
i(x))
−1 satisfies
− I
′
i(x)x
Ii(x)
= − u
′
i(Ii(x))
u′′i (Ii(x)) Ii(x)
= 1/γi(Ii(x)) . (43)
Defining
I(x, β) = exp
(
−
∫ x
1
1/((1− β)γi(Ii(y)) + β a) y−1 dy
)
,
we get
−Ix(x, β)x
I(x, β)
= 1/((1− β)γi(Ii(x)) + β a)
which clearly satisfies the required conditions, and
u′(x, β) = (I(x, β))−1
is the required marginal utility family.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Suppose that supx γi(x) ≤ infx γj(x) and let a =
supx γi(x). Then it suffices to show that the optimal portfolio holding of agent i is smaller
than that of an agent with constant relative risk aversion a and the portfolio holdings of
agent j are larger than that of an agent with constant relative risk aversion a. We only
prove the first claim, as the second claim is analogous.
Recall that Wit = Ii(yi U
′(DT )) where yi is the Lagrange multiplier for agent i and
therefore, by (43),
(1− γ−1i (Wi T ))Wi T = I(yi U ′(DT ) , β) + Ix(yi U ′(DT ) , β) yi U ′(DT ) .
Consider the family I(x, β) of Lemma B.2 and define the function
φ(β) =
Et[σ(DT ) γ
U(DT )U
′(DT ) (I(yi U ′(DT ) , β) + Ix(yi U ′(DT ) , β) yi U ′(DT ))]
Et[U ′(DT ) I(yi U ′(DT ) , β)]
.
Then by Proposition B.1, we have
φ(0) =
Et[σ(DT ) γ
U(DT )U
′(DT ) (Ii(yi U ′(DT )) + I ′i(yi U
′(DT )) yi U ′(DT ))]
Et[U ′(DT ) Ii(yi U ′(DT ))]
= eρ (T−t) (−σSt piit + λt) .
(44)
Furthermore, a direct calculation shows that
φ(1) =
(1− a−1)Et[σ(DT ) γU(DT )
(
(U ′(DT ))1−a
−1
)
]
Et[U ′(DT ) (U ′(DT ))1−a
−1 ]
(45)
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is independent of yi. Therefore, by Proposition B.1,
eρ (T−t) (σSt )
−1(−φ(1) + λt)
is the optimal portfolio holdings of an agent with risk aversion a. Here, the rate of
macroeconomic fluctuation ρt = ρ is constant by assumption. Thus, it suffices to show
that φ(β) is monotonically increasing.
Differentiating φ(β) with respect to β, we get
(Et[U
′(DT ) I(y U ′(DT ) , β)])
2 × φ′(β) =
= Et
[
σ(DT ) γ
U(DT )U
′(DT )
(
Iβ(yi U
′(DT ) , β) + Ixβ(yi U ′(DT ) , β) yi U ′(DT )
)]
×
Et[U
′(DT ) I(yi U ′(DT ) , β)]
− Et
[
σ(DT ) γ
U(DT )U
′(DT )
(
I(yi U
′(DT ) , β) + Ix(yi U ′(DT ) , β) yi U ′(DT )
)]
×
Et
[
U ′(DT ) Iβ(yi U ′(DT ) , β)
]
(46)
Now, by Corollary 3.2, the assumption that ρt is constant implies that DT = f(AT )
where AT has a Gaussian distribution. Modifying the function f if necessary, we may
assume without loss of generality that AT ∼ N(0, 1) . Then expression (46), multiplied
by 2pi, is given by∫
R
e−x
2/2 f ′(x) (−U ′′(f(x)))
(
Iβ(yiU
′(f(x)), β) + Ixβ(yiU ′(f(x)), β)yi U ′(f(x))
)
dx×∫
R
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) I(yiU ′(f(x)), β)) dx
−
∫
R
e−x
2/2 f ′(x) (−U ′′(f(x)))
(
I(yiU
′(f(x)), β) + Ix(yiU ′(f(x)), β)yiU ′(f(x))
)
dx×∫
R
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) Iβ(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx
(47)
Here, we often suppress the dependence on β. Now, we have
Iβ(x, β) + Ixβ(x, β)x dx =
d
dx
(Iβ(x, β)x)
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and therefore, integrating by parts, we get∫ +∞
−∞
e−x
2/2 f ′(x) (−U ′′(f(x)))
(
Iβ(yiU
′(f(x)), β) + Ixβ(yiU ′(f(x)), β)yi U ′(f(x))
)
dx
= −
∫ +∞
−∞
e−x
2/2 d
(
Iβ(yiU
′(f(x)), β) yi U ′(f(x))
)
= −
∫ +∞
−∞
x e−x
2/2 Iβ(yi U
′(f(x)), β) yi U ′(f(x)) dx ,
(48)
where the minus sign appears because U ′ is monotonically decreasing. Similarly,∫ +∞
−∞
e−x
2/2 f ′(x) (−U ′′(f(x)))
(
I(yiU
′(f(x)), β) + Ix(yiU ′(f(x)), β)yi U ′(f(x))
)
dx
= −
∫ +∞
−∞
e−x
2/2 d
(
I(yiU
′(f(x)), β) yi U ′(f(x))
)
= −
∫ +∞
−∞
x e−x
2/2 I(yi U
′(f(x)), β) yi U ′(f(x)) dx ,
(49)
Therefore, the expression in (47) is equal to
−
∫
R
x e−x
2/2 Iβ(yiU
′(f(x)), β) yiU ′(f(x)) dx
∫
R
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) I(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx
+
∫
R
x e−x
2/2 I(yiU
′(f(x)), β)yiU ′(f(x)) dx
∫
R
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) Iβ(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx .
(50)
By Lemma B.2,
0 > − ∂
∂β
Ix(x, β)
I(x, β)
= −Ixβ I − Ix Iβ
I2
x ,
that is
Ixβ I > Ix Iβ ⇔ ∂
∂x
Iβ
I
> 0 .
Consequently, the function
ψ(x) =
Iβ(yiU
′(f(x)), β)
I(yiU ′(f(x)), β)
is monotonically decreasing in x.
Introduce a new probability measure
dµ˜ =
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) I(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx∫
R e
−x2/2 U ′(f(x)) I(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx
.
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Then we can rewrite expression (50) in the form(∫
R
e−x
2/2 U ′(f(x)) I(yiU ′(f(x)), β) dx
)2 (−Eµ˜[AT ψ(AT )] + Eµ˜[AT ]Eµ˜[ψ(AT )] )
which is nonnegative by Lemma A.3.
Proof of Theorem 6.5. By (41), we need to show that
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs)dsWkT (1− γ−1k (Wk T ) )]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ]
≥
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs) dsWjT (1− γ−1j (Wj T ))]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWj T ] . (51)
We only prove case (1). Case (2) is analogous. Since, by assumption,
inf (1 − γ−1k T ) ≥ sup (1 − γ−1j T ),
it suffices to show that
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs)dsWkT
]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ] ≥
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs) dsWj T
]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWjT ] .
Introduce a new probability measure
dQk =
e−
R T
t rs dsWk T
EQ[e−
R T
t rs dsWk T ]
dQ
and let
f(x) =
Ij(yjx)
Ik(yk x)
.
and zi = Ii(λi x) , i ∈ {j , k} . Then
f ′(x) =
Ij(yj x)
x Ik(yk x)
(
yj x
I ′j(yj x)
Ij(yj x)
− yk x I
′
k(yj x)
Ik(yk x)
)
=
Ij(yj x)
x Ik(yk x)
(
u′j(z1)
z1 u′′j (z1)
− u
′
k(z2)
z2 u′′k(z2)
)
=
z1
x z2
(γ−1k (z2) − γ−1j (z1)) ≤ 0 .
(52)
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That is, f is decreasing. Therefore, f(U ′(DT )) is increasing and, by Lemma A.5,
EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs) dsWj T
]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWjT ]
=
EQkt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt ρs ds f(U ′(DT ))
]
EQkt [f(U
′(DT ))]
≤ EQkt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt ρsds] = EQt
[
γU(DT )σ
D(DT ) e
− R Tt (ρs+rs) dsWkT
]
EQt [e
− R Tt rs dsWkT ] .
(53)
Proofs of Proposition 9.4, Proposition 9.5 and Theorem 7.1. Propositions
9.4 and 9.5 follow directly from Lemma A.5. Theorem 7.1 follows from Theorem 5.2 and
Lemma A.5 since
f(x) = x − Rk(x)
is increasing if and only if
f ′(x) = 1 +
(u′′k)
2 − u′k(x)u′′′k (x)
(u′′k(x))2
=
1
(u′′k(x))2
(2 − Pk(x)Rk(x)) ≥ 0 ,
and is decreasing otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 9.8. Item (1) follows from γU ∈ [γ,Γ]. Items (2) and (3)
follow from
0 ≤ −(EQt [DT ])−1 CovQt (γU(DT ) , DT )
= − E
Q
t [γ
U(DT )DT ]
EQt [DT ]
+ EQt [γ
U(DT )] ≤ −γ + Γ .
(54)
Similarly,
0 ≤ −(EQt [WkT ])−1 CovQt (γU(DT ) , Wk T )
= − E
Q
t [γ
U(DT )Wk T ]
EQt [Wk T ]
+ EQt [γ
U(DT )] ≤ −γ + Γ
(55)
and items (2)-(3) immediately yield the required inequality for γk > 1. The case γk < 1
follows from the directly verifiable identity
pik t =
σ e−b (T−t)
σSt
(
γ−1k
EQt [γ
U(DT )Wk T ]
EQt [Wk T ]
− CovQt (γU(DT ) , Wk T )
)
.
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Example B.3 Suppose that the stock price St takes value 1 at time 0, values (u, d) =
(1.5, 0.5) with probabilities 0.5 at time 1, and the interest rate is 0. In the second period,
conditioned on u (resp. d), S2/S1 = (u1, d1) (resp. (u2, d2)). Let us denote by pi0 γ the
optimal stock weight at time 0 of a CRRA investor with risk aversion γ. Then a direct
calculation shows that
pi0 γ = −2 + 4
1 +
m1−b2 +(2−m2)1−b
m1−b1 +(2−m1)1−b
where m1 =
2(1−d1)
u1−d1 , m2 =
2(1−d2)
u2−d2 and b = γ
−1 . Clearly, by choosing different (u1, d1)
and (u2, d2) we can achieve any desirable monotonicity behavior in γ.
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